What the list is for
The controls below are written as tests. Each states what must be true on the path of the call, so a buyer or an engineer can check it. None depends on a particular framework, model, cloud or vendor.
The order matters. The first six govern the action. The last four govern the platform that governs the action.
The required-controls checklist
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Identity bound to principal. Every call carries a verifiable identity for the agent, with an owner and a risk tier, and, when the agent acts for a person or system, the identity of that principal. Pass: your identity provider verifies both on the call. Fail: identity is a header the agent writes about itself.
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Least privilege per action. Policy is written for this agent, this action, this target, not for the agent as a whole. Pass: a write to the ledger is a separate decision from a read. Fail: an agent trusted for one job inherits trust for all of them.
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Budget on the call. A spend limit is enforced when the call is made, with spend attributed per agent and rolled up to the originating request. Pass: the call that would breach the budget does not execute. Fail: finance sees the overrun in next month’s report.
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Human approval inline. High-risk actions stop and wait for a named person to approve them, on the call. Pass: the approval and the action land in the same record. Fail: sign-off is a design review or a dashboard someone checks next quarter.
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Whole-chain stop. Any agent, or a whole chain of agents, can be stopped immediately and stays stopped without waiting for credential expiry or rollback. Pass: the chain loses its credentials and a record shows nothing was authorised after the stop. Fail: revoking the assistant leaves the payments agent still moving money.
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Tamper-evident record. Every call, decision and outcome is recorded with the agent, the authority it acted under and the time, in a form a third party can verify without trusting the system that wrote it. Pass: an auditor verifies the chain offline. Fail: the evidence is a log you control.
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Monitor before enforce. The platform can run in a mode that observes every call, builds the inventory, shows what policy would have done, and refuses nothing. Pass: the estate is visible before any agent is blocked. Fail: turning it on blocks agents nobody knew about.
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Key custody stays with you. Credentials for downstream systems are encrypted under a key held in your own vault or key service, and the governing platform is a crypto user, not a custodian. Pass: rotating the key is your operation. Fail: the vendor holds the master key.
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Envelope-only scope. The platform governs the request envelope, identity, target, action, size, delegation chain, and does not read the payload. Pass: message bodies pass through unread. Fail: the platform becomes another place your data lives.
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Failure behaviour decided in advance. You decide, before go-live, what happens if the platform itself fails: keep applying the last decision for that agent and action, or refuse until recovery. Pass: the choice is configured and tested. Fail: the platform fails open or fails closed by accident.
What is deliberately not on the list
Content guardrails answer a different question. They inspect what is in a request and do not know who is calling. They belong inline, as a policy step scaled to the agent’s risk tier, with the verdict recorded, but they do not replace any of the ten. Tracing is not on the list either: a trace of what an agent did yesterday does not stop what it does today.
How KPATH maps to each control
| Control | How KPATH meets it |
|---|---|
| 1. Identity bound to principal | Met. Every call carries the agent’s identity with owner and risk tier, verified against your identity provider, and policy can insist the person an agent acts for is verified. |
| 2. Least privilege per action | Risk-tiered policy applied per action at the Policy Enforcement Point; a governed directory lists only the services policy allows. |
| 3. Budget on the call | Budget enforced on the call itself; spend attributed per agent and rolled up to the originating request. |
| 4. Human approval inline | High-risk actions wait for a person at the call; approval and decision recorded together. |
| 5. Whole-chain stop | Kill switch for any agent or a whole chain; the chain loses its credentials and stays stopped; containment proof shows nothing was authorised after the stop. Behaviour watch pauses out-of-pattern high-risk agents. |
| 6. Tamper-evident record | Met. The record is signed and tamper-evident, verifiable offline without trusting KPATH, exportable to write-once storage and streamed to your SIEM. |
| 7. Monitor before enforce | Every deployment starts in monitor mode: observe only, enforce no policy, rewrite no agents. Flip to enforce by repointing egress. |
| 8. Key custody stays with you | Met. Credentials are encrypted under a key in your own vault or key service. KPATH is a crypto user, not a custodian. |
| 9. Envelope-only scope | KPATH governs identity, target, action, size and delegation chain. Of the payload, it reads only the values you declare for a rule, such as a payment amount. Guardrails run inline inside your boundary. |
| 10. Failure behaviour decided in advance | Several redundant enforcement points; you choose last-decision or refuse-until-recovery. |
Using the list
Take the list into a vendor evaluation or an internal build review and mark each control pass or fail on a live chain, not on a slide. The controls most estates fail are four, five and six: the gap between governance on paper and enforcement at the moment of action.
Start with monitor mode: connect the agents, see what they reach, then apply the remaining controls to the actions that carry risk.